Poroi, 2, 2, November, 2003 ideologically Islamic identity" (1983, p. 167 To show this, the essay analyzes the political identity formulated during Iran's revolution in relation to the anti-imperial discourse of the Ayatollah that made opposition to the Shah into a cause of Islam.
The Rhetorical Use of Fard to Foster a Discourse of Ritualistic Obligation
6 Shi'ite Islam teaches a variety of religious practices as being mandatory for its followers. These include the seven major obligations: prayer, fasting, the paying of alms, a religious tax, the pilgrimage to Mecca, religious wars or striving ( jihad), while "enjoining the good and forbidding the evil" ( al-amr bi 'l-ma'ruf wa'l-nahy an'l-munkar) ('Ali 1990 ). Khomeini drew on the notion of obligation ( fard) inherent within Shi'ite Islam. Both jihad and "enjoining the good and forbidding the evil" are fard kifaya: obligations that can be fulfilled by a designated group to satisfy their requirement of the community (Dabashi 1993) . Deciding who should fulfill these requirements falls on the chief religious figure in the community, the marja'-e taqlid: the "source of exemplary conduct." As the supreme marja-'e taqlid, Khomeini was entrusted with the right to collect the religious tax, to order a Poroi, 2, 2, November, 2003 defensive jihad, and to require his followers to "enjoin the good and forbid evil."
7 The Shi'ite marja'-e taqlid also has the power to transform a fard kifaya (collective duty) into a fard 'ayn (individual duty), obliging each person in the community to act. As the highest ranking religious leader, Khomeini invoked these obligations. They became an early and pivotal part of his revolutionary discourse.
In Velayat-e Faqih, for example, he argued that "enjoining the good and forbidding the evil" is a responsibility for the whole Islamic community:
8 The Lord of the Martyrs (upon whom be peace) speaks of "summoning men to Islam while at the same time remedying oppression and opposing the oppressors;" it is for the sake of these great aims that enjoining the good and forbidding the evil has been made a duty. . . . "Enjoining the good and forbidding the evil" is most imperative in such cases [where the government opposes Islam].
9 Now let me ask you: were the subjects mentioned by the Lord of the Martyrs in his sermon addressed only to the companions who were gathered around him listening to his words? Does not the phrase "O people, take heed" address us too? Are we not included in "people?" (1981, pp. 118-119) .
10 Before Khomeini could transform performance of these religious practices into a revolutionary call for the entire nation, he needed to define what constitutes good and evil in a way compelling to a massive audience, and he needed to describe the evil forces in a manner that met doctrinal definitions inherent within jihad. Hence he created a fard 'ayn to impel Iranians to oppose the Shah. To define himself as good and the Shah as evil, Khomeini drew on symbolic and mythic dimensions of Shi'a Islam. He shaped these to oblige Iranians to enact a jihad against the Shah, and he strengthened their revolutionary spirit through the rhetorical use of ritualization.
Ideological and Historical Context
11 The Shah's rule was marked by rapid modernization coupled with a decided lean toward Western views and customs. The previously deposed Shah was indebted to the West after a 1953 coup, sponsored by the CIA, had returned him to power. The coup displaced a liberal-democratic movement headed by Mohammed Mosaddeq (Green 1982 (Ramazani 1982 ). Yet the poor planning of the White Revolution caused impoverishment of the peasantry, resulting in urbanization, slums, and unemployment.
13 The Shah responded to these tumultuous transformations by strengthening the power of his military forces, installing an autocratic form of one-party rule, and increasing the oppressive force of SAVAK, his secret police (Khosrow 1982) . Even before revolutionary protests began in the late seventies, the Pahlavi regime had estranged itself from the population. The regime was staunchly associated with Western values, failed economic policies, and violations of human and political rights.
14 Khomeini stood in clear contrast to the modernist, anti-Islamic leadership style of the Shah. He spoke to the nation from Iraq and France, delivering the weekly Khutbah or Friday sermon which would later be replayed in mosques throughout Iran (Ram 1994 ). The Khutbah is delivered by individuals of religious note and constitutes an obligatory service for Muslims ( 'Ali 1990) . Through these speeches and his written essays, the Ayatollah defined himself not only as a representative of the religious establishment but also as the embodiment of an anti-Western, anti-imperialist ideology.
15 Khomeini's anti- monotheism of Islam, which substituted God (Allah) for "good" and the devil (Shaitan) for "evil." Shaitan is known as the Great Satan, the great tempter, stemming from his role in the fall of Adam. Because Islam associates the devil with the exterior of the body or the nation, this figure of Satan was ripe for exploitation in a discourse of anti-Imperialism (Bateson 1977, pp. 269-270) .
18 The batin, or exterior, has strong negative implications rooted in the nation's past. Iranian history reveals a persistent pattern of foreign subjugation. From the classical period through the British and Russian occupations of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to recent politics, Iran has been overwhelmed by a succession of worldly powers, each emanating from the batin. The repeated usurpations have fed Iranian fears of the exterior, which threatens the zahir, the inside world of the Iranian nation. (Armajani 1979, pp. 17-18) . Yazid pursued the group and executed them brutally. In the Shi'ite religion, Husain is the greatest political hero, and Yazid the most heinous of all rulers. Yazid becomes the despicable evil among Iranians, one that must be destroyed. Sometimes Khomeini directly called the Shah "Yazid." On other occasions, he evoked the persona by comparison. In the Khutbah, "In Commemoration of the First Martyrs of the Revolution," Khomeini declared that "The Messenger of God (peace and blessings be upon him) was indeed a true Shadow of God; but is this vile Shah a shadow of God? Yes, a few thoughtless people among us say so, but that would mean that Yazid was also a 'holder of authority' and anyone who rebelled against him deserved to be killed!" (1981, p. 226) .
23 Khomeini constructed the United States as the Shaitan, the Great Satan, the evil enemy that threatens Iran from outside. For Iranians, the Great Satan is the lascivious and tempting devil, a corrupting force that becomes the ultimate menace to Islam (Beeman 1983) . Like radical Islamists before and since, Khomeini condemned the United States as a secular wasteland where wanton sexuality and consumer goods lure people into forgetting genuine goodness. Of course, he capitalized on the mythic relationship between Yazid and the Great Satan. Yazid was a pawn of Shaitan; thus the Shah, by analogy, was as a pawn of the Great Satan of America. Khomeini emphasized the Shah's addictive and poisonous service to the West by talking of Gharbzadegi or "Westoxication" (Rose 1983, p. 182) .
24 In contrast, the Ullama (the Iranian clergy) and various revolutionaries treated Khomeini as indigenous ( iraniyat) and hallowed, centering him within the good zahir (interior). This was evident in posters disseminated throughout Iran in praise of the Ayatollah. One illuminated Khomeini with a divine aura and said, "When the devil goes, the angel arrives" (Merriam 1981, p. 396) In opposition to the evil Shah and the satanic Americans, Khomeini became the Imam: the religious epitome of goodness, wisdom, and instruction. As a title, "Imam" marks the respect of the religious community, much as "reverend," "rabbi," or "father" does in other religions. Yet elements of Khomeini's persona and discourse also linked the title to a more transcendent image. Through his choice of theological stories and his charismatic, mystical presentation of them, Khomeini adhered closely to a culturally established figure of religious authority larger by far than a local priest or minister. '-l-munkar ("enjoining the good and forbidding the evil"), Khomeini established an exigency for action.
32 The pervasive power of Khomeini's discourse is apparent in an anecdote told by Jerrold Green. In a government copy center, Green attempted to reprint a revolutionary pamphlet. At first the man behind the desk, an employee of the Shah, refused. But later the man criticized the poor quality of the copy and produced another from a huge pile on his machine. Green viewed this incident as indicative of the allure of Khomeini's appeal. The copy machine employee, "in his own fashion, was a revolutionary. He was never recruited into a formal oppositional structure but rather responded to stimuli rampant in (Hegland 1983, pp. 229-230) . Many cases of similar testimony suggest that Khomeini's discourse resonated throughout the nation to alter conceptions of sacrifice and martyrdom. When the religious leaders finally called for the armed struggle, many Iranians responded to undo the Shah.
The Husain Ritual
38 Khomeini's messages of revolution culminated in a holy Islamic ritual. Ritual can have great power to commit people to causes or values. Langer explained that a ritual is "primarily an articulation of feelings. The ultimate product of such articulation is not a simple emotion, but a complex, permanent attitude . . .
[that] yields a strong sense of tribal or congregational unity, of rightness and security" (1957, p. 153) . According to Hegland (1983, p. 235) , the Husain ritual was the single most decisive factor in destroying the spirit of the Shah's army, resulting in the government's demise. In a war of numbers and will power, this ritual generated marches and demonstrations that involved millions of people, inducing the collapse of the Pahlavi dynasty.
39 The ritual originated in Husain's martyrdom at the hand of Yazid's army in a desert place called Karbala. Throughout each year, the Shi'ite calendar relates various stories tied to Karbala, with Ashura -the day of Husain's death -marking the climax. The ritual involves smiting the breast, chanting, and wailing (Pelly 1879); and the revolutionary performance altered little. Yet its meaning too was shaped by religious dissenters from the regime, especially by the Ayatollah, to serve the revolution. Hegland observes that "The success of the revolution followed a transformation in the understanding of the central message of Shi'i Islam among the Iranian masses. Leaders of the revolution from religious, educational, and bazaari groups were successful in their advocacy of revolution because they presented an ideology appealing to large numbers of both Shi'i Muslims and non-Shi'is" (1983, p. 219) . She concludes that the Husain persona shifted from "Husain as Intercessor," with people praying to him for favors and a path to paradise, to "Husain as Example," with people treating him as a role model for protest against the tyranny of an evil government (pp. 225-230) .
40 This shift proved crucial in mobilizing Iranian masses. It happened in three steps. The first was furnished by revolutionary leaders such as Dr. Ali Shari'ati, an Islamic scholar who preached resistance to unjust authority (Dabashi 1993, p. 102) . Many of these leaders had died or left the country, indeed Shari'ati perished two years before the revolution. yet their words provided a basis for the formation of dissent. The second step came from Khomeini. As the most widely recognized resistance leader, he promulgated revolutionary arguments that relied at times on the newly reconstructed persona of Husain. Third, the Ullama disseminated these revolutionary messages, promoting the new meaning of the Husain ritual throughout the nation. By the time the revolution reached its climax, vast numbers of Iranians shared the reconstructed sense of the Husain ritual. 43 From a rhetorical perspective, the use of this traditional religious ritual is striking. Bennett argues that the need for myth and ritual has deep roots as a "primary process [where] thinking is characterized by projection, fantasy, the incorporation of nonverbal imagery, a high emotional content . . . and the generation of multiple levels of meaning " (1983, p. 43) . Rituals bind people through shared symbols that create common purpose. The group dynamic can carry people farther than any individual would have gone. Analyzing the Husain ritual, Kertzer says that "the most dramatic role of ritual in the political process is that of inspiring masses of people to take some action. . . . Ritual provides the symbolism which makes action legitimate, while providing the social condition which makes taking action not only possible but often compelling and sometimes unreflective" (1983, p. 64) . Ritual acts help participants experience "truths" that obviate the need for independent cognition by the individuals who perform them.
44 Rituals are consummatory devices that can provide in themselves the basis for action (Aronoff 1983, p. 9 49 Iran still organizes itself according to the Khomeini's dictates, and Velayat-e Faqih is required reading for Iran's fifteen million school children (Arjomand 1980) . The impact of pan-Islamic versions of his discourse is notable throughout the Middle East. Many of Tehran's current strategies stem from Khomeini's revolutionary devices (Ibrahim 1992, p. 2) . To a world in the wake of 9/11, the Iranian Revolution and the hostage crisis of 1979 remain strong symbols of a clash of cultures that shadows in the possibility of Islamic revolutions elsewhere.
50 Despite the discourse of al Qaeda and other radical Islamists, however, the revolutionary pendulum in Iran appears to be swinging in an opposite direction. The student protests in 1999 and again in 2003 portend an ending or at least a softening of Khomeini's Islamic Revolution. Students who were not yet born during Khomeini' s revolution protest the political, religious, and personal oppressions in Iran. Their criticisms seem ironically similar to dissent from the Shah's regime a quarter-century before. How these events might continue, how the recent war in Iraq might affect its neighbor, and how worries about nuclear weapons in Iran might influence grass-roots attitudes toward the current religious and political leadership remain to be seen. In many respects, though, the rhetoric of the Iranian Revolution and Khomeini's discourse of Islamic radicalism seem likely to remain dynamics important for the region and the world.
Notes 1
This analysis serves a different goal from the one addressed by Heisey and Trebing. In their analysis, they compared the "rhetorical visions" presented to the Iranian people by both the Shah and Khomeini. This work concentrates on the theological and ideological grounding of Khomeini' s discourse and the impact it had on creating what has become an enduring Islamic identity.
